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The quality of governance and education 
spending in Africa
M.E. Nyamongo & N.J. Schoeman
1A B S T R A C T
This study investigates the eff ects of the quality of governance, 
namely corruption, political instability and democracy, on the 
public budget allocation to education by using data for a panel of 
28 African countries over the period 1995–2004. The estimation 
results show that education expenditure is aff ected by the level of 
corruption, with highly corrupt countries devoting a smaller share 
of their budgets to this vote. Political instability impacts negatively 
on education, but the level of democracy does not seem to have 
a prominent eff ect in this regard. However, International Monetary 
Fund programmes favour expenditure on education as part of its 
intended capacity-building eff ort. 
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Background
A voluminous literature exists regarding budget priorities, especially allocations to 
education (Aschauer 1989; Barro 1990; Levine & Renelt 1992; Easterly & Rebelo 1993; 
Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou 1996; Gupta, Clements & Tiongson 1998; Nyamongo 
2007). Most of these studies find that the composition of government in terms of 
representation and quality of service delivery is critical with respect to its influence 
on economic growth performance. In studies such as Hanushek (1995), Mingat and 
Tan (1998), Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) and Carmignani (2008), the impact of 
educational expenditure on growth is further explored, and typical drivers that affect 
the level of prioritisation with regard to educational expenditures are identified. 
Dr M.E. Nyamongo is in the Research and Policy Analysis Department at the Central Bank of Kenya and Prof. N.J. 
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These drivers include conventional factors such as the level of income per capita 
and demographic characteristics (see Mauro 1998; Stasavage 2005; Shelton 2007). In 
these and other studies, the important role of the quality of governance is prominently 
highlighted. For example, the level of corruption in a country is analysed by Mauro 
(1998), Tanzi (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) and Delavallade (2006), while 
Habibi (1992) and Stasavage (2005) find democracy to be instrumental in the public 
budget allocation to education.
The purpose and objectives of the study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the factors that determine education 
spending in Africa. The study was motivated by various other studies in the recent 
past that highlight the importance of educational spending as a priority, especially 
the driving forces behind spending on education compared to military expenditure. 
In this regard, see Habibi (1992), Stasavage (2005) and Delavallade (2006). This 
study contributes to the literature by adding a new dimension which, apart from the 
conventional factors, indicates how, in an African context, institutional governance 
factors play a role in the allocation of government spending in education. The specific 
objectives of the study include:
• Identifying the factors that determine education spending in Africa
• Establishing whether the nature of governance affects government  spending on 
education
• Identifying some clear guidelines based on the findings on spending patterns in 
the 28 African countries included in the study, which should be useful to policy-
makers when deciding their expenditure priorities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the second section discusses the 
trend in public expenditures in Africa; the third section outlines the framework used 
in the model; while the fourth section analyses the empirical results. The last section 
contains some concluding remarks.
Review of government spending on education
Figure 1 shows the average distribution of government expenditure in Africa during 
the period 1995–2004. The figure suggests that education spending tends to account 
for a relatively larger average share of the budget (16.3%), and in many cases it tops 
the list of expenditures, with health and social welfare expenditures accounting for 
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an average of 12.8%. Expenditures on public administration account for 22.3%, while 
the share of economic services is only 15.0%.
Source: IMF, Government Financial Statistics (various issues)
Figure 1: Average distribution of government expenditure in Africa (1995–2004)
Figure 2 shows the distribution of government expenditure as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) to various functional spending categories in Africa during 
the period 1995–2004. The public service spending category accounts for the highest 
share of GDP (7.7%), followed by the spending category ‘other’ (6.5%). Among the 
social sector spending categories, education accounts for the highest share of GDP 
(5.3%), which is almost double the share of the health and social welfare spending 
categories. The economic services spending category amounts to 4.9% of GDP, and 
defence spending is at 4.5%. It can be seen that the public budget allocation in Africa 
during this period was tilted towards public services, defence and education. 
Methodology
Analytical framework
This study uses a modified and extended version of the model developed by Hewitt 
(1992, 1993), which is used to analyse the determinants of military expenditure. In 

















M.E. Nyamongo & N.J. Schoeman
4 
Source: IMF, Government Financial Statistics (various issues) 
Figure 2: Average distribution of public budget/GDP ratios in Africa (1995–2004)
categories. Government spending, G, is a composite of education spending, E, and 
other expenditures, O, such that:
OEG +=   1
As proposed by Hewitt (1992, 1993) and Gupta, De Mello & Sharan (2001), 
government spending is financed through taxation, borrowing and seigniorage. 
Therefore, the government budget constraint in period t (t = 1) can be approximated 
as in Beetsma & Bovenberg 1999, 2002 as: 
 2a 2a
where G1 is government spending in period 1 and πk is revenue from seigniorage. 
Debt at time t = 1 is defined as 011 )1( drdD ++= , where 1D  is the accumulated 
debt, which is the sum of the debt accumulated in the current period (d1), plus the 
debt of the previous period, together with the interest thereon. If seigniorage ( πk ) is 
excluded, the government budget constraint is approximated as:
111 DTG +=    2b
G1 = T1 + [1 + r)d0 + d1] + kπ1  1  [(   r 0  π
The quality of governance and education spending in Africa
5 
It is also assumed that in period t = 1, government revenue (tax) is a function of 
income  1Y . That is:
 11 YT τ=  10 ≤≤ τ  3
In order to simplify the analysis, the we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function of 
the form:
δγβ OECOECU =),,(  4
The function is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable on private con-
sumption (C) and government spending (G), with fU >0 and ffU <0 for GCf ,= , 
where γβδ −−= 1 . Finally, for tractability, no private investment is assumed, and 
time indices are omitted for notational simplicity. Therefore, the utility maximiser’s 
problem (in this case the ruling authority) is stated as:
Max δγβ OECOECU =),,(  5
Subject to:
,GCY +=  and OEG +=  6


























































In equation 7a, for a given tax rateτ , the share of spending category E in income 
and total government spending depends on the parameters of the utility functionsγ  
and β . In the same vein, in equation 7b, for a given level of tax rateτ , the share of the 
‘other’ spending category, O, in income and total government spending depends on 
the parameters of the utility functionsδ and β . This, therefore, suggests that a higher
γ relative to β , leads to an increase in the education spending category relative to 
private consumption. The same is true for a higher value of δ relative to β , which also 
leads to an increase in spending in ‘other’ spending relative to private consumption. 
This approach is in line with the thinking of Gupta et al. (2001), who argue that the 
effect of the quality of governance may be established by its effect on the parameters 
f
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in equations 7a and 7b. In this regard, the association between quality of governance 
and education spending and ‘other’ spending categories is described as follows: 
Let the parameters of the utility functionγ , β andδ be affected by the quality of 
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In this study, the quality of governance is measured using three indicators, namely 
the level of corruption, political stability and the level of democracy and human rights. 
Against this background, the effect of the quality of governance could be interpreted 
in three ways. Firstly, in the case of corruption, an increase in E spending can be 
expected as long as the government perceives such an increase as an opportunity 
to misuse public money for private benefit. Secondly, the corrupt government will 
allocate a larger portion of the budget to education as long as such expenditures are 
regarded as important for staying in power. Lastly, government will allocate a larger 
share of the budget to education should it be viewed as appealing to the median voter, 
thereby increasing the chances of being re-elected. In view of the above, the general 
education spending model can be defined as:
dQQ










E τγβ=  10
Because τγβ ,,  and Q are not directly observable, the impact of the quality of 
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where t is a time index and j indexes the countries in the panel, jtY
E )( is the ratioof 
education to GDP; jtG
E )( is the ratio of education spending to total government 
spending; jtY
G )( is the ratio of total government spending to GDP; Q is a vector of 
the quality of governance indicators; jtG
D )( and jtY
D )( are, respectively, the ratios of 
the public debt to the total public budget and the GDP; jtK is a vector of the state 
variables; while jtε and vjt are the idiosyncratic error terms.
By estimating equations 11a and 11b, the ratio of total government spending (G) 
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Factors that aff ect budget allocations to education
In the literature, a number of factors are identified that explain the allocation of 
the public budget to education. Prominent among those is the level of corruption 
in a country. As argued by Mauro (1998), the educational sector offers fewer 
opportunities for corruption that might influence the flow of funding to this sector. 
Thus, a negative relationship can be expected between education spending and 
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do not attract any substantial rent, but investment in educational structures such 
as schools and universities with value-intensive laboratories may create avenues for 
corruption that Mauro (1998) ignores. In this study, therefore, we do not state any a 
priori expectations with regard to the role of corruption on education spending.
The political environment in a country, as reflected in its human and political 
rights as well as transparency with regard to government expenditure, also impacts 
on budget allocations to education. As suggested by Habibi (1992), Stasavage (2005) 
and Delavallade (2006), in an environment that features improved levels of human 
rights and democracy, governments would spend more on electorate preferences 
such as education. Therefore, one can expect that higher levels of education will be 
associated with more liberal rights and democracy. 
Political instability will obviously trigger budget allocation to those sectors that 
are critical to restoring stability. As suggested in the literature (see Kimenyi & 
Mbaku 1995), a country that is under constant threat of instability tends to structure 
its budget allocations in favour of those functional categories that seek to restore 
stability; obviously, education spending is not one of them. This, therefore, suggests 
that politically stable countries will devote more resources to education.  
In the models developed by Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Mahdavi (2004), debt 
accumulation is instrumental in the allocation of the public budget. For example, 
higher levels of public debt will tend to enhance the shares of expenditure on 
economic services, health and education, because funds generated through external 
and internal loans are usually channelled to these sectors. 
The level of income per capita also affects the allocation of the public budget. 
This draws from Wagner’s law, which hypothesised that government spending would 
increase in the course of development to a modern society, which, as argued by 
Mahdavi (2004), reflects a greater role for the government as the economy becomes 
more complex and the demand for public goods and social programmes rises. 
Consequently, changes in the structure of the public budget are likely to occur as a 
country advances from lower levels of development. As shown in the literature (see 
Sheldon 2007; Stasavage 2005; Delavallade 2006; Nyamongo 2007; and Mauro 1998), 
a positive relationship exists between education spending and the level of GDP per 
capita. Thus, in this analysis, we a priori expect to find a positive relationship between 
these variables.
Education spending is also affected by numerous demographic characteristics. 
For example, Sheldon (2007), Delavallade (2006) and Stasavage (2005) find 
especially that the proportion of the population under 15 years of age is positively 
correlated with education spending. The reason is obviously that the bulk of pupils 
fall within this age category, with educational expenditures largely flowing towards 
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primary education and the first two grades in secondary education. Furthermore, 
Stasavage (2005) identifies the rate of urbanisation as an important indicator; in 
particular, the ratio of the rural to urban population is a critical indicator of the 
level of expenditure on education. The more dense the population, the higher the 
proportion of expenditure on education compared with the rest of the budget. 
The size of the government relative to the size of the economy is also important 
in determining the structure of the budget. As observed by Mahdavi (2004), the size 
of government relative to the size of the economy serves to absorb the effects of more 
cyclical factors, such as changes in the tax base and non-tax government revenues. It 
is also argued that the size of government is associated with factors that may impact 
on the composition of total spending. These factors include the level of corruption, 
exposure to external risks such as trade shocks and exposure to internal risks such as 
political instability and social conflicts. 
In the African context, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
influencing total government expenditure allocation is well documented. As far as 
fiscal policy is concerned, the IMF’s advice to its members has largely remained that 
of improving the public spending mix, which favours productive and social spending. 
Thus, in view of this emphasis on investment in human capital, the mere existence of 
IMF programmes in a country is expected to favour budget allocations to education.
Model specifi cation 
In view of the framework and discussion in the previous two sub-sections, the model 
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Lypc is the real per capita GDP, which serves as a proxy for the level of development; 
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the government relative to the size of the economy; DEM is a vector of demographic 
characteristics such as population, population structure, density and urbanisation; 
POL is the political stability index, which measures the level of political stability 
in a country; Acc is the voice and accountability index, which measures the level of 
democracy, political and civil rights in a country; and Cor is the corruption control 
index, which measures the state of corruption in a country. IMF is the IMF dummy, 
which reflects the degree of reform in a country in terms of openness and democracy.
Description of the data
Sources and type
Annual data for 28 African countries1 are used over the period 1995–2004. The 
variables used in this study are as follows:
• Education spending expressed as a ratio of the total public budget and of the GDP. 
The data are obtained from IMF, Government Financial Statistics (various issues).
• The corruption control index, political stability index, and voice and accountability 
index are the quality of governance measures and are obtained from Kaufman, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi (2006).
• The variables, size of government, level of income (GDP), external debt, population 
aged 0–14, population density, and urbanisation rates are sourced from the World 
Bank, African Development Indicators (various issues).
• The IMF dummy is constructed on the basis of information available from the 
IMF. A country is assigned a value of 1 if IMF programmes have been implemented 
in a given year for at least six months, and a value of 0 if not.
The choice and measurement2 of governance indicators
Data reflecting the level of governance can be obtained from a number of different 
institutions. In this study, the authors used the World Bank data set for several reasons. 
Firstly, it contains data collected by 31 firms that construct governance indicators, 
which makes it a hybrid index encompassing all the attributes of these individual 
indicators. Secondly, individual firms use different methodologies to construct their 
indices for various uses. The performance of the World Bank data set is superior in 
this regard, because it draws from a wide variety of sources, which makes it more 
reliable overall. Thirdly, the number of countries and territories used by individual 
firms is less than the number available from the World Bank database. For example, 
the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy data include only ten countries, the 
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Political Risk Services data reflect 140 countries, and the Afro-barometer data 
include only 18 countries. Using data from these individual sources would have 
reduced the number of countries in this study because, apart from being limited 
in terms of coverage, they are also limited in terms of the periods covered. Lastly, 
compared to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International 
(TI), for example, the World Bank data set is superior because it does not use lagged 
data when current data are not available, which is the methodology used by TI when 
constructing the CPI (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi. 2006). 
The corruption control index is a proxy for the level of corruption. It captures 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as a ‘capture’ of the state of elites and their 
private interests. It is constructed in such a way that a country that demonstrates the 
least effort in combating corruption (therefore having a higher level of corruption) 
is assigned a value of -2.5, while one showing greater effort in combating corruption 
(resulting in a lower level of corruption) is assigned a value of +2.5. The political 
stability index is a proxy for the level of political stability in a country. It measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism. 
The political stability index is constructed in such a way that a country that is most 
politically unstable is assigned a value of -2.5, while one that is politically stable is 
assigned a value of +2.5. The voice and accountability index measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as the level of freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the 
media. The voice and accountability index is constructed in such way that a country 
ranking poorly in voice and accountability is assigned a value of -2.5, while one that 
is ranked highly is assigned a value of +2.5.
Empirical results
Preliminary fi ndings
Figure 3 shows the relationship between a corruption control index and education 
spending as a ratio of total government expenditure. From the figure, it appears 
that, of the most corrupt countries, Kenya and Sierra Leone devote a larger share of 
their total government expenditure to education, while Nigeria, Gambia and Angola 
allocate the least.
Among the less corrupt countries, Namibia, South Africa, Madagascar and 
Moroc co devote the largest shares of their public budgets to education, while 
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Note: See endnote no. 1 for country abbreviations.
Figure 3: Corruption control index and education spending as a ratio of the total 
budget
Mauritius and Eritrea allocate the least. Generally, there appears to be a weak positive 
relationship between the corruption control index and education spending, but the 
trend suggests that countries that are less corrupt tend to allocate a larger share of 
their budgets to education, which is consistent with Mauro (1998).
Note: See endnote no. 1 for country abbreviations.
Figure 4: Political stability index and education spending as a ratio of the total budget
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between the political stability index and education 
spending as a ratio of the total public budget. From the figure, it appears that of the 
most politically unstable countries, Angola, Nigeria and Djibouti, devote the smallest 
shares of their budgets to education, while Sierra Leone and Burundi allocate larger 
shares of their budgets. Among the more stable countries, Swaziland, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Botswana allocate the largest shares of their budgets to education, 
while Mauritius, Mali and Eritrea allocate the smallest shares. Generally, there is 
a positive relationship between the political stability index and education spending, 
which suggests that as a country becomes more politically stable, it spends more on 
education.
Note: See endnote no. 1 for country abbreviations.
Figure 5: Voice and accountability index and education spending as a ratio of the total 
budget
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the voice and accountability index and 
education spending. From the figure, it is evident that countries that rank poorly in 
terms of voice and accountability allocate a smaller share of their budgets to education; 
Angola, Nigeria and Eritrea have the smallest allocations, while Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland and Gambia allocate larger shares of their budgets to the education vote. 
Among the countries that rank highly in terms of voice and accountability, Namibia, 
Senegal and Lesotho allocate the largest shares of their budgets to education, while 
Mali and Mauritius allocate the least. It is also evident from the scatter plot that, 
on average, a positive relationship exists between the voice and accountability index 
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themselves freely, and are transparent and accountable, allocate larger shares of their 
budgets to education.
Estimation results 
This section analyses estimation results on education spending as a share of the total 
public budget and as a share of the GDP. Bivariate3 and multivariate analyses are 
performed. This enables controlling for the importance of each of the governance 
indicators. 
Tables 1–3 show the estimation results of the share of education spending in the 
total public budget and the GDP. The results reveal that the estimated coefficients 
of the corruption control index are unambiguously positive and significant across 
all estimations in the full sample, which largely supports studies by Mauro (1998). 
However, in the estimations where the dependent variable is a share of the total 
budget, the estimated coefficients are positive and insignificant for the most corrupt 
countries, and negative and significant for the least corrupt countries. In contrast, in 
the estimations where the dependent variable is expressed as a share of the GDP, the 
estimated coefficients are negative and insignificant for the more corrupt countries, 
and positive and significant for the least corrupt countries. This result suggests that 
high levels of corruption are associated with low levels of education spending, which 
is consistent with Mauro (1998), as explained previously, given the high percentage 
of recurrent expenditure in the total education budget, which does not really allow 
for corruption.
The political stability index is unambiguously negative and significant in most of 
the full sample estimations. The estimations for the sub-samples yield coefficients 
with mixed signs. If the dependent variable (educational expenditures) is defined as 
a share of the total public budget, the coefficients are negative and significant in all 
sub-samples. However, when defined in terms of GDP, the results are mixed, with 
the ‘more corrupt’ sub-sample showing negative and significant coefficients, and the 
‘less corrupt’ sub-sample yielding positive and significant coefficients. This result 
suggests that as a country becomes more politically stable, less of its public budget 
is devoted to education. This may be because in politically unstable countries, the 
government is the sole provider of education, since political instability discourages 
private investment in education. As a country becomes more stable, private investment 
in education increases, which may encourage governments to cut their allocation.
The voice and accountability index produces mixed signs in the estimations. In 
those estimations where the dependent variable is defined as its share of the total 
public budget, the voice and accountability index produces mixed signs and is not 
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significant at the conventional levels of testing. Similarly, in the estimations where 
the dependent variable is defined as its share to GDP, the coefficients also have 
mixed signs and are insignificant in all estimations for the sub-sample. However, the 
positive and significant coefficient shows that a high level of voice and accountability 
is positively related to education spending, which means that a high regard for human 
rights is consistent with the findings of Habibi (1992) and Sheldon (2007). This is 
because as a country becomes more open and transparent particularly with regard 
to its fiscal policy, the budget allocation priorities more closely reflect socio-priorities 
such as education. 
The estimated coefficients for the size of the government are found to be positive 
and significant at the 1% level of testing in all the estimations in both the full sample 
and the sub-samples. This seems to suggest that if a country maintains a large 
public sector relative to its GDP, it tends to allocate a larger portion of its budget 
to education. Greater demand for education prompts governments to employ more 
educational staff and increase investment in educational structures such as schools. 
However, it is significant to note that the estimated coefficients are higher among 
less corrupt countries than both the ‘more corrupt’ sub-sample and the full sample. 
Thus, the results indicate that in less corrupt countries, education spending is more 
responsive to changes in the size of government than in more corrupt countries.
In the full sample estimations, the coefficients of public debt are largely insignificant 
in all the estimations. This result supports the views of Devarajan, Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (1999), who found that higher levels of foreign aid will favour education 
spending on a one-to-one basis. The same is true for the ‘less corrupt’ sub-sample, 
where the estimated coefficients have mixed signs and are largely insignificant at 
the conventional levels of testing. In contrast, in the ‘more corrupt’ sub-sample, 
public debt has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant in most cases. 
Those estimations with negative coefficients are found to be insignificant, which 
confirms the findings of Stasavage (2005). The results therefore suggest that in 
less corrupt countries, the size of the public debt does not really affect the level of 
funding towards education, while strong evidence exists to the contrary among the 
most corrupt countries. 
Estimation coefficients for population density consistently have negative or 
positive signs in the full sample estimation, depending on whether the dependent 
variable is the share of the total public budget or of the GDP. In those cases where the 
dependent variable is the share of the total public budget, the estimated coefficients 
are negative and significant at the conventional levels. Similar results are reported in 
the ‘less corrupt’ sub-sample. However, in those cases where the dependent variable is 
a share of the GDP, the estimated coefficients are found to be positive and significant 
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at the conventional levels of testing, and similar results are replicated in all the sub-
samples.
As expected, the proportion of the population under the age of 14 years is 
positively related to education spending in all estimations for the full sample, which 
is consistent with Stasavage (2005) and Shelton (2007). However, in those cases 
where the dependent variable is the share of the total public budget, the estimation 
coefficient is negative and insignificant in all the sub-samples. In those sub-samples 
where the dependent variable is a share of GDP, the estimated coefficients are positive 
and significant at the conventional levels of testing. The positive signs imply that as 
the proportion of the population within the 0–14 age group increases, so does the 
demand for education, which is in agreement with Stasavage (2005) in his model of 
government expenditure on primary education among African countries. 
In the full sample, the estimated coefficients of the GDP per capita are positive 
and significant in all the estimations except one. However, for the sub-samples, 
when the dependent variable is a share of the budget, the estimated coefficients 
have unexpected negative signs for the ‘more corrupt’ sub-sample. The coefficients 
are significant in almost half of the estimations for the least corrupt countries. In 
contrast, when the dependent variable is a share of GDP, all the coefficients of the 
GDP per capita have the expected positive sign. This phenomenon suggests that as a 
country develops, it tends to increase its spending on education, which is consistent 
with Stasavage (2005) and Shelton (2007). 
The role of IMF programmes in tilting budgets towards spending on education 
is also established in the full sample estimations, where all the estimated coefficients 
are positive. However, in those cases where the dependent variable is a share of the 
GDP, the estimated coefficients are insignificant, while in those cases where the 
dependent variable is a share of the total budget, they are highly significant. Further 
analysis reveals that in all cases where the dependent variable is a share of total 
budget, the IMF dummy is positive and significant in the ‘more corrupt’ sub-sample, 
and where the dependent variable is a share of GDP, the IMF dummy is negative 
and insignificant. The coefficients are significant and positive for all estimations 
for the ‘less corrupt’ sub-sample. These results show that IMF programmes play 
a prominent role in the allocation of public resources to the educational sector, 
particularly among less corrupt countries. This finding is largely in agreement with 
the findings of Gupta et al. (1998).
Estimated coefficients of the IMF interaction variable are negative and significant 
in the full sample, and the coefficients are less than unity for all the estimations. This 
implies that in the full sample, education spending is resilient. When the sample 
is divided into the ‘most corrupt’ and ‘less corrupt’ sub-samples, no significant 
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differences emerge. In all the sub-samples, the estimated coefficients are negative, 
as expected, and the coefficients are less than unity, which is consistent with the full 
sample results. However, it is worth noting that although education spending appears 
resilient, the ‘less corrupt’ sub-sample portrays relatively higher estimated elasticities 
in all cases, which implies that education spending is relatively less resilient in less 
corrupt countries. 
Conclusions
This study shows mixed results concerning the impact of the quality of governance 
on expenditure priorities using the three indicators, namely the level of corruption, 
political stability and the level of democracy and human rights as criteria. In general, 
the coefficients of the corruption control index are positive and significant in all 
the estimations for the full sample, which suggests that countries that are corrupt 
tend to spend a lower proportion of their budgets on education. Conversely, the 
coefficients for the political stability index are negative and significant in most of 
the estimations in the full sample. Similar results are obtained for the sub-samples, 
except in the ‘less corrupt’ sub-sample when the dependent variable is defined as a 
share of GDP, in which case the estimated coefficients are positive and sometimes 
significant. The role of voice and accountability is not very prominent in deciding 
the budget allocations in favour of education. From the results, it could be deduced 
that also in Africa, countries characterised by ‘better’ levels of good governance tend 
to favour expenditures on education, while the less competent governments (in terms 
of the criteria for good governance) spend more on the military. The more corrupt 
the government is, the more is spent on the military, because this provides more 
opportunities for forceful political dominance and other corrupt practices such as 
bribery in the purchase of military equipment. This finding is further substantiated 
by the fact that in cases where countries are bound by conditions set by the IMF 
when implementing IMF support programmes, these countries (adjusting countries) 
tend to allocate a larger portion of their budgets to education compared to those 
not involved in such programmes. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative 
and significant at the conventional levels of testing. The estimated coefficients are 
less than unity, which implies that the rate of increase of education spending as a 
share of the total public budget is lower than the decline in the total public budget-
to-GDP ratio. These results suggest that countries that have implemented IMF 
programmes tend to have resilient education spending compared to those without 
such programmes. IMF support programmes, by their very nature, normally set 
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conditions such as borrowing and spending constraints that limit malpractices such 
as corruption and political oppression. 
Factors tested in this analysis but not directly related to the quality of governance 
that impacts on expenditure decisions include the demography of the population, 
the level of the public debt and the level of economic growth. As could be expected, 
demographic variables, including population density and the proportion of the 
population aged 0–14 years, play an important role in motivating budget allocations 
to education. In most African countries, education is a public good provided by 
government, and with more pupils in the relevant age group, more infrastructure is 
needed to provide educational services. Another variable that was tested, namely, the 
impact of public debt on expenditure priorities, surprisingly did not show meaningful 
results. The coefficients of public debt are not significant at the conventional levels of 
testing in approximately all the estimations, although the majority of the estimations 
show a slightly positive relationship between public debt and education spending. 
The coefficient of income per capita is positive and significant in all the estimations.
Endnotes
1. Full sample: Angola (Ang), Botswana (Bots), Burundi (Bur), Cameroon (Came), Côte 
d’Ivoire (CDI), Djibouti (Dji), Ethiopia (Eth), Eritrea (Eri), Ghana (Gha), Guinea-
Bissau (Gunb), Kenya (Ken), Lesotho (Les), Madagascar (Madag), Malawi (Malaw), 
Mali (Mali), Mauritius (Maur), Morocco (Moro), Namibia (Nam), Niger (Niger), 
 Nigeria  (Nga), Rwanda (Rwa), Senegal (Sen), Sierra Leone (Sleon), South Africa 
(ZAR), Swaziland (Swa), Gambia (Gam), Uganda (Uga), Tunisia (Tun). ‘More cor-
rupt’ countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Uganda. ‘Less corrupt’ 
countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
 Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia.
2. For information regarding construction of these indices, see Kaufman & Mastruzzi 
(2006).
3. The estimation results of the bivariate regressions are not reported, but are available 
from the authors on request.
4. The sample was divided into two, namely the ‘less corrupt’ and ‘more corrupt’. The 
‘more corrupt’ includes those countries in the sample that post a less than average full 
sample score using the corruption control index, while the ‘less corrupt’ score above the 
average score.
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